

NDT Master Bibliography

Bibliography 1.10

Bree Beal · September 2026 · Reader companion

The bibliography brings together NDT's publications, works examined in the Literature Review and Explorer, and selected reading that helps place those encounters in their intellectual settings. Entries are organized by publication rather than by the number of claims drawn from a publication. Citing a work does not imply agreement with its conclusions or evidence for NDT as a whole.

A few routes into the reading

- For the development of NDT, begin with Beal's 2020 critique of moral monism and pluralism, the two 2021 articles, and the 2022 commentary on polyphony. The dissertation and later essays provide a wider setting.
- For the moral-foundations and dyadic-morality encounters, read the developed accounts alongside their later refinements: Graham and colleagues (2013) with Atari and colleagues (2023); Schein and Gray (2018) with Gray and colleagues (2022). Earlier papers identify stages in a lineage, not necessarily its final commitments.
- For NDT's background in practical understanding and culturally meaningful situations, the selected works by Heidegger, Shweder and collaborators, Gilligan, and Wainryb accompany Beal's discussions. Their inclusion does not create an additional formal comparison or settle an interpretation of an entire tradition.
- For an enactive account of how events acquire significance for an organism, Di Paolo (2005) provides a focused comparison with NDT's encoded evaluation, not a formal match to its moral-judgment architecture.

The Literature Review explains how individual claims are used. The appendix connects the project's passage-level source identifiers to the consolidated entries. A paper-level reference indicates that the source record does not provide an exact claim locator; a paper's complete page range should not be mistaken for one.

NDT publications and essays

Beal, B. L. (2018). *Raskolnikov's confession: A Dostoevskian model of moral psychology* [Doctoral dissertation, Emory University]. [Source](#).

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External works

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The linked German text reproduces the 1999 Suhrkamp collected edition; it is not the English translation listed in the entry.

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Appendix. Passage-level source crosswalk

Source identifiers name individual source records, not separate publications. Different passages from Hume, Kant, Dung, Schein and Gray, Turiel, Rai and Fiske, and Ramezani and Xu therefore remain separately traceable. The table preserves all 77 source units associated with Source Register 2.15, including sources for all 48 comparison records.

The twelve contextual additions have no source-unit identifier: Atari and colleagues (2023); Di Paolo (2005); Gilligan (1993); Gray, Gray, and Wegner (2007); Gray and colleagues (2022); Gray and Pratt (2025); Heidegger (2010); Much and Shweder (1978); Shweder (1992); Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller (1987); Shweder and colleagues (1997); and Wainryb (2004). Their publication entries do not add or reclassify a governed comparison.

Source unit	Publication	Cited location
S01	Aristotle. (n.d.-a)	Part 7
S02	Hume, D. (n.d.)	2.3.3.3; SBN p. 414
S03	Makinson, D., & van der Torre, L. (2007)	Paper-level reference
S04	Searle, J. R. (1964)	Paper-level reference
S05	Dung, P. M. (1995)	Definition 20, p. 329
S06	Bentham, J. (n.d.)	Chapter I, §II
S07	Kant, Groundwork (1785; translations listed separately)	Formula of Humanity; Academy 4:429
S08	Ross, W. D. (1930)	Chapter 2, p. 28
S09	Aristotle. (n.d.-b)	Books I–II
S10	Held, V. (1995)	Paper-level reference
S11	Scanlon, T. M. (1998)	Chapter 5, p. 189
S12	Mack, E. (2026, June 3)	§2
S13	Aquinas, T. (1920)	I–II, question 94, article 2
S14	Austin, M. W. (n.d.)	§4d; secondary account of Adams
S15	Dancy, J. (2004)	Chapter 1, p. 7
S16	Graham et al. (2011)	p. 366
S17	Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018)	p. 32

Source unit	Publication	Cited location
S18	Turiel, E. (1983)	Chapter 4, p. 61
S19	Curry, O. S., Mullins, D. A., & Whitehouse, H. (2019)	Paper-level reference
S20	Rai, T. S., & Fiske, A. P. (2011)	p. 58
S21	Kleiman-Weiner, M., Saxe, R., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2017)	Author manuscript, p. 2
S22	Friston et al. (2017)	Paper-level reference
S23	Bai et al. (2022)	Preprint-level reference
S24	Hendrycks et al. (2021)	Paper-level reference
S25	Beal, B. (2020)	Article-level reference
S26	Beal, B. (2021)	Article-level reference
S27	Beal, B., & Gogia, G. (2021)	Article-level reference
S28	Beal, B. (2022)	Commentary-level reference
S29	Beal, B. L. (2018)	Dissertation-level reference
S30	Beal, B. (2025a, January 20)	Essay-level reference
S31	Beal, B. (2025b, January 31)	Essay-level reference
S32	Beal, B. (2026)	Essay-level reference
S33	Herman, B. (1993)	“On the value of acting from the motive of duty,” p. 21
S34	Arpaly, N. (2003)	“Moral worth,” p. 72
S35	Markovits, J. (2010)	p. 202
S36	Sliwa, P. (2016)	p. 393
S37	Hart, H. L. A., & Honoré, T. (1985)	Book-level reference
S38	Wright, R. W. (1985)	p. 1774
S39	Halpern, J. Y., & Pearl, J. (2005)	Paper-level reference
S40	Levine, S., Chater, N., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Cushman, F. (2026)	Manuscript, p. 13

Source unit	Publication	Cited location
S41	Ramezani, A., & Xu, Y. (2025)	p. 120
S42	Pollock, J. L. (1987)	p. 484
S43	Horty, J. F. (2012)	Publisher abstract
S44	Bakhtin, M. M. (1984)	Chapter 1, p. 6
S45	Mackie, J. L. (1977)	Chapter 1, §2, p. 17
S46	Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957)	§33, p. 60
S47	Davidson, D. (2006)	2006 collection, p. 132; original essay 1978
S48	Hume, D. (n.d.)	3.1.1.27; SBN pp. 469–470
S49	Hume, D. (n.d.)	2.3.3.8; SBN p. 417
S50	Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2004)	p. 60
S51	Graham et al. (2013)	p. 63
S52	Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018)	p. 32 (source record lists p. 33)
S53	Turiel, E. (1983)	Chapter 4, p. 64
S54	Rai, T. S., & Fiske, A. P. (2011)	p. 58
S55	Ramezani, A., & Xu, Y. (2025)	§5.1
S56	Dung, P. M. (1995)	Definition 7, p. 327
S57	Kant, Groundwork (1785; translations listed separately)	Section I, shopkeeper; Academy 4:397
S58	Nichols, S. (2002)	Paper-level reference
S59	Wittgenstein, L. (1953)	§§65–67
S60	Beal, B., & Rottman, J. (2024)	Submitted manuscript, 2024
S61	Cushman, F., & Young, L. (2011)	Paper-level reference
S62	Van Bavel et al. (2012)	Paper-level reference
S63	Sinnott-Armstrong, W., & Wheatley, T. (2014)	Abstract, p. 451
S64	Kumar, V. (2016)	Paper-level reference

Source unit	Publication	Cited location
S65	Neta, R. (2015)	Paper-level reference
S66	Neta, R. (2019)	Abstract, p. 179
S67	McCain, K. (2012)	Abstract, p. 357
S68	Lord, E., & Sylvan, K. (2020)	Authors' abstract; §2.2, pp. 148–150
S69	Silva, P., Jr. (2015)	Paper-level reference
S77	Dehaene, S., & Naccache, L. (2001)	§6.2, p. 30
S78	Gaertner, S. L., Mann, J., Murrell, A., & Dovidio, J. F. (1989)	Abstract, p. 239
S79	Laurenceau, J.-P., Barrett, L. F., & Pietromonaco, P. R. (1998)	Discussion, p. 1247
S80	Batson, C. D., Klein, T. R., Highberger, L., & Shaw, L. L. (1995)	Abstract, p. 1042
S81	Levinas, E. (1991)	“Ethics and the face,” p. 198
S82	Uhlmann, E. L., Pizarro, D. A., & Diermeier, D. (2015)	Abstract, p. 72
S83	Haidt, J. (2001)	Central claim, p. 817
S84	Crimston, D., Bain, P. G., Hornsey, M. J., & Bastian, B. (2016)	Abstract, p. 636

Edition notes

Kant’s Formula of Humanity and shopkeeper passages are identified by Academy location. The Wood and Gregor–Timmermann translations are listed as separate reading editions; the project’s online-text references do not establish either as the source of the registered English wording.

Davidson’s “Intending” was first published in 1978. The cited page 132 belongs to the 2006 collection, whose publication details are given in the bibliography.

“Prime time (for the basing relation)” is indexed in the passage record as Sylvan and Lord (2019). The publisher lists the chapter as Lord and Sylvan in a collection with a 2020 copyright date. The two forms identify the same chapter; the crosswalk retains the original source-unit identity.

Wittgenstein’s work was first published in 1953. The available linked German edition is identified separately from the English translation; it does not verify the English wording recorded under the project’s original online reference.

For ancient works and undated online texts, section references identify the passages. “n.d.” marks an undated online edition, not uncertainty about whether the work predates NDT.